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Tom Baker and Sean J. Griffith Ensuring Corporate Misconduct: How Liability Insur-
ance Undermines Shareholder Litigation. Chicago and London, The University of Chi-
cago Press 2010, 285 pages, ISBN 978-0-226-0315-4.
In their book Tom Baker and Sean Griffith explore how effective shareholder liti-
gation is in regulating corporate conduct.
Baker and Griffith start with the observation that shareholder litigation forms an
important part of the structure of law and regulation affecting American busi-
ness. Shareholder litigation is important because public regulators cannot oversee
every company at every moment; they cannot even respond to every report of a
(potential) wrong. Investors who find themselves wronged by a corporation in
which they have invested can sue to right these wrongs. These lawsuits exert their
regulatory effect through the mechanism of deterrence. Prospective wrongdoers
realise that they will have to account for damages they cause. Directors and cor-
porate officers will refrain from engaging in conduct that will harm investors and
induce them to sue. This is how shareholder litigation is thought to regulate cor-
porate conduct. The problem with this line of reasoning is that most officers and
directors are covered by a form of insurance, known as ‘Directors’ and ‘Officers’
liability insurance’ or ‘D & O insurance’ (bestuurdersaansprakelijkheidsverzekering).
Baker and Griffith’s central argument of is that D & O insurance significantly
erodes the deterrent effect of shareholder litigation and undermines its effective-
ness in regulating corporate conduct.
The book is structured systematically and is very readable. Even technical insur-
ance issues are clearly explained. The authors employ an interdisciplinary
approach. For all issues they discuss the legal frame and theories and findings
from law and economics literature. But the authors did more than merely review
the literature. They empirically investigated what D & O insurance companies,
underwriters and businesses do and why, and how this fits in with the theoretical
assumptions from the literature. Between 2005 and 2007 the authors conducted
semi-structured interviews with over 100 people working in and around the fields
of D & O insurance and securities litigation. They also participated in numerous
conferences and discussions with industry professionals and academics. The goals
of the empirical research are to test the hypotheses about insurance and deter-
rence and to learn about the role of D & O insurance in shareholder litigation. For
me, this combination of theoretical assumptions and empirical research is the
strong point of this book. In the remainder of this review I will first summarise
the analysis of Baker and Griffith. Next I will give some comments.
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The authors start with a legal analysis of the various claims that can be brought
by shareholder plaintiffs (Chapter 2). They proceed by explaining D & O insur-
ance: what is it, what is covered, what is excluded and what does the D & O mar-
ket look like (Chapter 3)? A D & O insurance package typically consists of three
parts: coverage to protect the individual officers and directors (level A), coverage
to reimburse the corporation for indemnifying its officers and directors (level B)
and coverage of the corporate entity itself (level C) (pp. 46-48). Most publicly tra-
ded corporations in the United States buy D & O insurance that includes all types
of cover.
In Chapter 4 Baker and Griffith deal with what they call their ‘first puzzle’: Why
do so many corporations buy entity-level coverage (level B en C)? The authors
argue that this D & O coverage appears to be irrational: the costs are not out-
weighed by the advantages. Shareholders have a cheaper way to spread the risk of
loss: a diversified portfolio of investments.1 Moreover, D & O insurance introdu-
ces a moral hazard concern. The concept of moral hazard refers to the tendency of
insurance to increase loss by reducing an insured’s incentive to avoid loss
(because a loss is covered by the insurance). This seriously decreases the deter-
rence effect of shareholder litigation. Baker and Griffith conclude, ‘Our essential
story is simple enough: managers want corporate protection included in D & O
insurance, shareholders don’t, managers win. Not a cheerful story.’ (p. 75).
The next chapters discuss available mechanisms to constrain the moral hazard
problem and to reinvigorate the deterrence effect of shareholder litigation. Three
traditional tools of the insurance trade are evaluated empirically: 1) pricing cover-
age to risk, 2) monitoring corporate conduct and 3) control over defence and set-
tlement. Making insurance expensive for high risks could reintroduce the deter-
rence function of shareholder litigation. Firms have an incentive to avoid high
costs. Screening and selecting risk is indeed a key aspect of D & O insurance
underwriting. In assessing risks, underwriters use various sources of information
concerning the riskiness of the prospective insured: financial information, news
reports, extensive application forms and interviews with directors and officers.
The underwriter evaluates the financial risks and the risks of corporate gover-
nance, and attaches a price to it. So, D & O insurers do attempt to price risks.
However, the authors do not conclude that this is sufficient to reintroduce deter-
rence. Underwriters make mistakes in pricing and the cyclical nature of the insur-
ance market suggests that risk selection is only important in hard markets (and
less important in soft markets). Moreover, D & O insurance expenses are too
small in relation to the overall costs of the company, and the difference between
premiums paid by good and bad firms may not be sufficiently large to force bad
firms to improve. ‘Instead, all firms will simply pay their D & O premiums, what-
ever they are, and continue with business as usual.’ (p. 104 (Chapter 5)).
A second means by which insurers may reintroduce deterrence is insurance moni-
toring and loss-prevention programmes. Baker and Griffith expected D & O
1 Also De Jong 2010, p. 374.
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insurers to monitor insured firms for three reasons. For economists, monitoring
is one of the explanations why corporations buy insurance while for the insurer it
is part of the answer to the moral hazard problem. Historical and sociological
studies documented the loss-prevention role of insurance in other contexts. For
example, insurance companies have contributed to the increasing safety in the
shipbuilding and construction industry. Other examples include home security,
management of physical disabilities, the motion-picture business and sexual har-
assment in the workplace. Prior literature on D & O insurance has claimed that
D & O insurance provides a monitoring function (p. 108).2 The interviews reveal
that D & O insurers in fact do almost nothing to monitor the corporations they
insure, and insured corporations are not required to install a loss-prevention pro-
gramme. In all interviews only one publicly traded corporation changed a busi-
ness practice in response to a governance concern from a D & O insurer (p. 109).
Loss-prevention conditions and advice are frequently provided in the private and
non-profit D & O insurance market. In that market D & O insurance is sold as
part of a package that also includes employment liability risks. Loss-prevention
efforts focus on employment practices (p. 110).
Several respondents mentioned a small specialised insurance company with a rep-
utation for emphasising loss prevention. They had developed an extensive loss-
prevention guide. However, this loss-prevention effort did not work. The com-
pany could not prove the connection between loss-prevention program and
reduced loss and could not offer reduced premiums to firms that complied with
the guidelines. Companies chose to buy D & O insurance from a competing
insurer without loss-prevention requirements. As a result the company was
forced to drop its loss-prevention programme (pp. 111-113). This story points to
the explanation Baker and Griffith offer for why D & O insurers do not offer loss-
prevention services. Top executives buy D & O insurance, with their shareholder
money, to make it easier and more profitable for them to keep their jobs. But they
do not want to hand over some of their powers to insurers (Chapter 6).
After the conclusion that D & O insurers do not succeed in deterring the kinds of
bad corporate acts that lead to shareholder litigation at the time the insurance is
purchased (pricing) and during the life of the insurance contract (monitoring),
claim management is another opportunity for the insurer to force a bad corporate
actor to pay for its bad acts. Once a claim has arisen, the insurer can attempt to
exert control over defence and settlement of the claim. D & O insurance coverage
usually includes costs of defence as well as costs of a settlement or payment of
damages. Insurance companies tend to take over control over the defence of the
claim, for example, vehicle and general liability insurance. Instead, D & O insur-
ance policies put the policyholder in charge and D & O insurers have little ability
to control the costs of defence and settlement of claims. Defence lawyers and
plaintiffs’ lawyers cooperate to place pressure on insurers to pay. Shareholder
claims are easy to settle because the settlement is largely funded by insurance
2 Also Weterings 2010, p. 167.
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companies. ‘Other people’s money, our respondents confirmed, is often viewed as
easy money’ (p. 136, (Chapter 7)).
Chapter 8 explores what matters in the settlement of shareholder litigation. The
authors discuss five key features that influence settlement values: investor loss,
insurance limits and structure, ‘sex appeal’ (cases that arouse scandal, media
attention), litigation dynamics (such as chemistry among parties) and statistical
information from other settlements. Chapter 9 investigates the potential dispute
between defendants and the D & O insurers about coverage defences.
[T]he coverage dispute is the last opportunity for a D & O insurance to force a
corporate actor to pay for the harm it has caused. (…) Simply stated, corpo-
rate actors may be more likely to be good because they will understand that if
they are very bad, then their liabilities may not be covered by D & O insur-
ance. (pp. 178-179).
Once the policyholder gives notice of the lawsuit, the insurer typically responds
with a ‘reservation of rights’ letter. Most D & O policies contain exclusions for
fraudulent or criminal acts and for unjust-enrichment. These exclusions do in fact
not prevent moral hazard because plaintiffs’ lawyers plead strategically to avoid
handing the insurer a valid coverage defence (framing as reckless misstatements
rather than intentional fraud). ‘Finally, insurers understand that, in the long run,
their D &O insurance market will dry up if they press too hard on the fraud exclu-
sion’ (p. 188). Baker and Griffith conclude ‘it seems that D & O insurance carriers
are willing to cover honest fraud’ (p. 188). Although D & O insurers will often
have a coverage defence and rescission may be an option legally, it will often be a
bad idea from a business perspective. Several respondents illustrated this through
an anecdote involving the Genesis Insurance Company. Genesis sought to rescind
its D & O policy asserting fraud in the application. The court ultimately sided
with Genesis and the policy was fully rescinded. This victory in litigation, how-
ever, was a Pyrrhic victory. Genesis soon failed because of its negative reputation
of being overzealous in avoiding the payment of claims.
Coverage defences thus are rarely used to avoid payment but they are used to
reduce the amount that insurers must ultimately pay at settlement. Baker and
Griffith conclude: ‘in claims management, as in underwriting and during the life
of the insurance contract, insurers in fact are able to do relatively little to reintro-
duce the deterrence function of shareholder litigation’ (p. 199).
The last chapter offers solutions to improve the deterrence function of
shareholder litigation. The authors do not propose to abolish either shareholder
litigation or D & O insurance. They recommend three solutions: 1) mandatory
disclosure of D & O policy details (price, coverage, exclusions, etcetera) in order to
signal information to the capital market, 2) co-insurance in order to give the cor-
poration a financial incentive to monitor managerial conduct and to limit settle-
ment costs, and 3) disclosure of information at settlement in order to provide
capital market participants a window into the merits of claims. The authors
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‘believe that these proposals may serve to reinvigorate the deterrence function of
shareholder litigation’ (p. 234).
Baker and Griffith give a fascinating glimpse behind the scenes of the world of
American D & O insurance. If you are interested in this hidden world you should
absolutely read this book. However, some questions remain after reading the
book.
The picture of insurance companies without much control over the corporations
and the risks they insure is rather disturbing. Why do insurers act this way?
I would expect that an insurance company needs to have control over (at least
part of) the key factors that determine profit. But D & O insurers seem to have a
low level of control over corporate conduct, risks, defence costs, settlements and
prices (cyclical). So why do they offer D & O insurance? Maybe the prices are high
enough, even in highly competitive markets at the bottom of the business cycle,
to make this insurance profitable? Or is D & O part of a package with other more
controllable risks?
The policy recommendations seem to rest on the same assumptions that, accord-
ing to the previous chapters, did not in fact work. For example, the authors advo-
cate mandatory disclosure of D & O policy details because this would signal infor-
mation to capital markets. This recommendation assumes that underwriters and
insurers value risks accurately to make policy premiums and conditions a good
indicator for the quality of corporate governance. However, Chapter 5 showed
that D & O insurers try their best to assess the risks, but that they only partly
succeed in doing so. The last chapter seems to rely on wishful thinking rather
than on the results of the investigation.
The question whether a director or officer who is legally liable is really sued is not
brought up. Sociological investigations in different fields show each time that
people generally tend to avoid mobilising the law. This applies to individual citi-
zens in claiming their rights3 as much as it does to firms that normally do not
legally enforce contract compliance in deliverance and supply transactions.4 Sev-
eral factors contribute to the reticence of firms to take a business partner to
court: no quick solution of the problem and long uncertainty because of lengthy
legal proceedings and high litigation costs. Particularly important is the risk that
an appeal to the law will disrupt long-lasting business relations and will trouble
future business transactions. Comparable processes will make suing directors or
officers in cases of corporate misconduct unattractive. This is in line with the
caselaw published in 10 years of the Dutch corporate law journal Jurisprudentie
Onderneming & Recht.5 External liability claims were mostly submitted after bank-
ruptcy of the corporation, either by shareholders whose shares lost their value or
by unpaid creditors. Sitting directors hardly ever submit a claim against a fellow
3 Blankenburg 1995; Havinga 2010a, 2010b; Miller & Sarat 1981; Niemeijer & Klein Haarhuis
2008.
4 Macaulay 1963; Jettinghoff 2001.
5 Internal memo by B.J. de Jong.
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director or officer holding them liable for loss. Generally it is a trustee in bank-
ruptcy that submits a liability claim. Occasionally (newly installed) directors sue a
former director or officer. Armour et al. found that lawsuits against directors of
public companies alleging breach of duty are virtually non-existent in the United
Kingdom. The United States is more litigious, but only a small percentage of pub-
lic companies face lawsuits against directors alleging a breach of duty that is suffi-
ciently contentious to result in a reported judicial opinion, and a substantial por-
tion of these cases are dismissed.6
The book is strong in its logical structure and clear message. But it is precisely
this clear message that induced a shadow of doubt: did the authors perhaps struc-
ture their argument too much around their clear message instead of presenting
all available (also contradictory) information? It’s hard to tell.
In discussing this book during the Law and Society meeting in San Francisco and
in her subsequent book review, Miriam Baer argues that Baker and Griffith
assume that D & O liability claims involve ‘ordinary fraud’ that is beyond the pale
of public enforcement.7 Baer sees three causes of shareholder loss: 1) ‘incompe-
tence and bad decision-making’, 2) ‘ordinary fraud’, that is misconduct that is not so
harmful to draw public (enforcement) attention, 3) ‘extraordinary fraud’ which
involves severe losses and many victims and therefore triggers criminal and civil
investigations by public authorities. The boundary between ordinary and extraor-
dinary fraud is porous. Once upon a time Madoff’s investment may have seemed
to be ordinary fraud; in 2009 his conduct turned into a huge scandal. The fact
that extraordinary fraud elicits substantial public sanctions that alter managerial
conduct together with the difficulty of distinguishing between ordinary and
extraordinary fraud, fill some of the vacuum left by D & O insurance according to
Baer.8
What about D & O insurance in the Netherlands? Dutch civil law also provides a
basis for liability of corporate officers and directors for damages caused by
improper performance of duties (onbehoorlijke taakvervulling). Dutch courts tend
to accept liability in cases of serious accusations (ernstig verwijt).9 Usually liability
suits involve claims from shareholders or creditors. Under Dutch law a share-
holder can bring a suit against a director or officer on the basis of loss to him- or
herself, as an individual or as a class action. However, derivative suits (share-
holder sues on behalf of the corporation) are not possible under Dutch law.10
6 Armour et al.2009.
7 Baer 2012.
8 Baer 2012, p. 950.
9 See HR 8 december 2006, NJ 2006, 659 (Ontvanger/Roelofsen), HR 20 juni 2008, NJ 2009, 21
(Willemsen/NOM) and Lennarts & De Valk 2012 on Rb Utrecht 15 februari 2012 (Kortekaas/
Fortis).
10 Kroese 2004.
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D & O insurance has become more important in the Netherlands recently.11
Almost all corporations in the Dutch Top 500 buy D & O insurance, whereas at a
rough estimate 40% of the other large and medium-sized companies are insured
for D & O liability. The number of claims and notifications is increasing, in partic-
ular after bankruptcy. The number of lawsuits and awarded damages is still limi-
ted.12 Nevertheless, Eshuis et al.13 found 70 cases in 10 years of published case
law, in which a corporation sued a director, a former director or officer for being
liable for losses of the corporation.
Weterings’ description of the D & O insurance practice in the Netherlands devi-
ates from the picture presented by Baker and Griffith. Weterings states that ‘the
incentives from liability law are partly taken over by D & O insurance. The insurer
monitors the insured corporations more closely than other insurances. Insurers
use screening during application and during the insurance. Insurance is only for
12 months in order to allow adaptation of premiums, insured value and condi-
tions.’14 How can we account for this different picture of Dutch D & O insurance?
Have D & O insurers in the Netherlands succeeded in restoring the deterrence
function? Or did Baker and Griffith do more in-depth research, thereby getting
below the surface of the public image of the D & O insurance industry? Will
shareholder litigation in the Netherlands develop in the direction of US share-
holder litigation? A recent decision of the Utrecht court made Lennarts and De
Valk fear for a new trend: shareholders claiming collective damages against direc-
tors and officers of publicly traded corporations because of misrepresentation.15
Because damages in liability claims may amount to considerable sums of money,
they advise directors and officers to provide for good D & O insurance!16
The investigation by Baker and Griffith clearly shows that economic theories and
models do not always predict accurately what happens in reality. Business people
do not only act as a homo economicus, rationally calculating pros and cons. Ensur-
ing corporate conduct offers a lively picture of the complex interrelationships
between insurance companies, underwriters and insured corporations.
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